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Profiling Lone-Actor Terrorists: A Cross-Sectional Study of
Lone-actor Terrorists in Western Europe (2015–2016)
Abstract
Lone-actor terrorism is a growing threat in Western European countries as the numbers of
lone-actor terrorist attacks have multiplied over the last 15 years. However, knowledge on
this type of terrorism is insufficient. This current study evaluates whether there are any
common personal, social, psychological, and operational characteristics among lone-actor
terrorists (LATs) and whether any profile can be drawn in regard to a lone-actor terrorist.
The authors identified 36 LATs between January 1, 2015, and December 31, 2016, in
Western European countries through the Global Terrorism Database. The study profiled
these LATs regarding their sociodemographic characteristics, attack characteristics,
method of radicalization, ideology, modus operandi, and typology. Findings of this study
show that lone-actor terrorism in Western Europe has undergone new changes, and
although there is no single unique profile for LATs, there are common characteristics that
warrant further studies.
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Introduction
Although traditional group-based terrorism is still highly active, loneactor terrorism is gaining more ground.1 In Western countries, this
growing threat is even more tangible as the number of lone-actor
terrorism attacks has multiplied over the last 15 years, and experts
believe it will become the most prevalent form of terrorism in the
future.2 According to the European Counter Terrorism Center, loneactor terrorism is the most favored type of terrorism by both the
Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIS) and Al Qaeda, and it was a
major threat for European countries in 2017.3
Moreover, lone-actor terrorism is hard to combat.4 Usually, LATs have
no obvious contacts with terrorist groups or with elements monitored
by security and intelligence organizations. As a result, LATs can
operate without detection before the attack.5 Therefore, any explicit
information and knowledge about the characteristics of LATs has high
value for counterterrorism.6
Similar to other criminals, lone-actor terrorists (LATs) and their
characteristics change over time; as a result, the available knowledge
about them is insufficient.7 Nevertheless, studies have attempted to
elucidate different characteristics of LATs.8 Scholars have tried to aid
policy makers, law enforcement, and the security and intelligence
apparatus to prevent and counter LATs by using profiling since they
believe that LATs may have similar characteristics.9
Profiling previous LATs can provide valuable knowledge about which
individuals may become LATs and which persons are prone to take
violent actions.10 This knowledge can also explain better why some
individuals are susceptible to radicalization.11 Therefore, based on the
Global Terrorism Database (GTD), the objective of this current study is
to evaluate LATs through criminal profiling. Since terrorist are also
criminals, we believe that criminological theories and methods are
applicable to the case of terrorism and terrorists.12 The study will thus
evaluate LATs’ demographics (age and gender), social (previous
criminal record, type of criminal record, and migration status),
psychological (mental and psychological status, social status, ideology,
radicalization, and typology of LAT), and operational characteristics
(leakage of information, modus operandi, and whether they are known
by security and intelligence agencies).
The next section defines important concepts used in this article. The
third section, Profiling in Terrorism, gives a brief overview of the
notion of profiling and presents the studied characteristics in this
article. The fourth section, Data Collection, outlines the methods of the
study, followed by the results section. The last two sections discuss the
results and offer a conclusion as well as future implications.
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Concept Definition
Terrorism
Although there is no consensus on the definition of terrorism, three
factors are common in most definitions. To deem an action as
“terrorism,” the action must
1. be illegal according to the laws of the host country,
2. have political motives, and
3. be intended to intimidate the public.13
Regarding political motives, the action must aim at attaining political,
social, or religious objectives. Based on these factors, we define
terrorism as a violent action or threat against random or selective
individuals conducted for political motives to influence the public
through the creation of fear.14
Lone-Actor Terrorism
An LAT is often called a lone-wolf terrorist. In the wild animal world, a
lone wolf is a wolf that prefers to leave the pack and hunt alone. Thus, a
lone-wolf terrorist—or, more correctly, a lone-actor terrorist—is an
individual or a small group of terrorists who operate alone.15 Hence, the
LAT or LATs plan, organize, and carry out the actions without any
physical, financial, or other support from a terrorist group or network,
even though those groups may have inspired the LAT.16 The Countering
Lone-Actor Terrorism project (CLAT) defines lone-actor terrorism as
follows:
Threat or use of violence by a single perpetrator (or small cell),
not acting out of purely personal or material reasons, with the aim
of influencing a wider audience, and who acts without any direct
support in the planning, preparation, and execution of the attack,
and whose decision to act is not directed by any group or other
individuals although possibly inspired by others.17
Profiling
Although no single definition for criminal profiling exists and scholars
have given several definitions for this concept, the objective in all
definitions is similar: To provide useful information to assist law
enforcement in identifying and locating offenders and detecting
potential offenders.18 Therefore, profiling is a process of drawing a
possible image of a likely offender. The foundation of profiling is the
belief that offenders committing similar crimes also share similar
characteristics.19 Behavioral consistency theory is the basis of this view,
and it states that primary traits are stable and general in a way that
they lead an individual to behave in a specific way across different
situations. Further, according to the homology assumption, offenders
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of a specific crime share similar background characteristics.20 Thus,
Richard Kocsis defines criminal profiling as follows:
The process of identifying personality traits, behavioral
tendencies, geographic locations, and demographic or biological
descriptors of an offender based on characteristics of the crime.21

Profiling in Terrorism Studies
In terrorism studies, profiling is a new and understudied discipline that
has been practiced mainly since the 9/11 terrorist attacks.22 Terrorism
scholars argue that since terrorist groups and networks target specific
individuals for radicalization, these individuals should have common
characteristics.23 Accordingly, by identifying these characteristics,
government agencies may be able to detect individuals at risk for
radicalization.
On the other hand, some scholars believe that profiling terrorists is
impossible because their motivations and aims vary.24 However, in
recent years, profiling terrorists has been widely practiced in both the
academic field and counterterrorism, and the Council of the European
Union recommends its members to work together on this specific task
in order to assist law enforcement to identify and locate probable
terrorists. According to the recommendation, terrorist profiling is
about collecting a set of physical, psychological, and behavioral
characteristics that are common in individuals who engage in terrorist
activities, and it can aid predictive practices as well.25
Profiling Lone-Actor Terrorists
Unlike different and sometimes opposing views about terrorism
profiling in general, when it comes to lone-actor terrorists, there is an
agreement that LATs may have common specific characteristics.26
Scholars have argued that this is because of fundamental differences
between traditional group-based terrorism and lone-actor terrorism.
The main difference between the two types of terrorism is probably that
LATs share relatively similar characteristics concerning their personal
and social characteristics, ideology, modus operandi, and typology.27
Demographics
The age and gender of terrorists are the main personal characteristics
that terrorism scholars study, just like criminologists examining other
types of violent crimes. In criminology, offence varies with age, and
young males have a stronger tendency toward high-risk violent
activities than females.28 Studies in terrorism show that most terrorist
group members are males who join the groups when they are young.29
However, in relation to LATs, previous studies indicate that LATs tend
to be older than traditional group-based terrorists are. One study from
the CLAT project on 120 LATs between 2000 and 2014 in Europe
27
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showed that all the included LATs were male with an average age of
close to 30.30 Another study on 119 LATs between 1990 and 2013 in the
United States and Europe supports these findings, stating that 98
percent of the identified LATs were male and that the average age was
33.31 Moreover, some studies state that the age of an LAT depends on
his/her ideology and can thus be different.32 Therefore, based on
previous studies, LATs are likely to be male and older than traditional
group-based terrorists are.
Social characteristics
Having previous criminal record is one of the similarities between both
terrorists and violent criminals.33 Concerning LATs though, the
frequency of this factor is not high. While, for example, a study by the
CLAT project found that only 33 percent of the sample of LATs (n=120)
had a previous criminal record, another study found that this factor
varies based on the ideology of the offender and is less viable among
Islamist LATs.34 Previous criminal record is thus a non-specific factor
in LATs.
Psychological Characteristics
Mental and psychological status is another personal characteristic often
discussed regarding LATs.35 Considering a terrorist as an individual
with mental disorders is common among both the mass media and the
public.36 This is especially the case for LATs since they are often
socially isolated individuals.37 Gruenewald and his colleagues found
that 40 percent of 70 right wing LATs in the United States between
1990 and 2008 had mental disorders.38 Spaaij noted that mental illness
is an important factor and that the social isolation of LATs is, in fact,
the result of their mental disorders.39 On the other hand, a study of 119
LATs showed that only 32 percent of them had mental disorders.40 A
study from the CLAT project also states that only 35 percent of the
LATs had mental disorders, and Perry and his colleagues argued that
mental disorder varies among LATs with different ideologies.41
Although there is no consensus regarding frequency and the role of
mental disorders among LATs, the majority of studies state that mental
disorders among LATs are relatively more common in comparison to
traditional group-based terrorists.
Regarding social status, studies claim that LATs are more likely to be
socially isolated.42 They tend to be single and live alone. They do not
have friends and might have problems with their parents as well.43 For
instance, Gill and his colleagues found that just more than half (52
percent) of their identified LATs (n=120) were socially isolated. 44 On
the other hand, some studies show that being socially isolated is not
common among LATs. The study by the CLAT project and the study by
Perry et al. showed that only 29 percent and 30 percent of the LATs,
respectively, had been socially isolated.45 Consequently, despite
opposite views regarding this variable, it is clear that social isolation
28
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may be more common among LATs in comparison to traditional groupbased terrorists.
Ideology is an important factor when discussing LATs.46 In most loneactor terrorism studies, ideology has been the most powerful
provocative factor for the actors.47 For instance, both the study by Gill
et al. and the study by the CLAT project showed that ideology plays a
key role, and more than 70 percent of the LATs were ideologically
motivated.48 Consequently, some scholars categorize LATs by their
ideology.49
In discussing the role of ideology in lone-actor terrorism, radicalization
is an important concept. It is the process of fundamental changes in an
individual’s beliefs, where the individual gradually adopts extreme
views about political, social, or religious matters and tends to justify the
use of extreme violence as a solution.50 For LATs, who in most cases do
not have any direct contact with a radical group or individual,
radicalization usually happens via the Internet, especially through
social media.51 By providing a safe and secure platform on which to
connect with other like-minded individuals, the Internet increases the
likelihood of self-radicalization for LATs.52 The aforementioned study
by the CLAT project showed that more than half (54 percent) of the
LATs in its sample (n=120) used the Internet to obtain training
knowledge.53 As a result, the Internet and social media are an
important way of radicalizing LATs.
Regarding the typology of LATs, Pantucci proposed a typology for
characterizing Islamist LATs.54 It divided them into three different
types: Loner, lone wolf, and lone-wolf pack. Although this typology
foremost applies to Islamist LATs, it can also be used in discussing all
types of LATs, which is why it is used in this study. Loner, in Pantucci’s
typology, refers to individuals with an extreme ideology who carry out
their attacks without having any direct or real contact with a radicalized
person or an extremist group. This type of LAT usually becomes radical
via the Internet and social media. The lone wolf is an individual who
has had some contact with a terrorist group or extremist network but
planned, organized, and carried out his/her actions entirely alone. The
lone-wolf pack has the same characteristics as loners except that they
comprise more than one individual and, in fact, are a small cell.
Pantucci also proposed a fourth typology, lone attackers. We do not use
this last typology in this study since lone attackers are members of a
terrorist group and receive orders to undertake a terrorist attack alone.
Therefore, they do not fit the definition of lone-actor terrorists.
Generally, LATs tend to be loners.55 In Teich’s study, which included 73
Islamist LATs between 1990 and 2013 in the United States and
Western Europe, 55 percent were loners, 24 percent were lone wolves,
and 21 percent were in lone-wolf packs.56
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Operational Characteristics
Scholars argue that investigating the modus operandi of LATs provides
useful knowledge for counterterrorism activities.57 Accordingly,
weapon, target, victim, frequency of attacks, and number of attackers
are of importance. Previous studies show that LATs tend to use
firearms more than any other weapon in their attacks.58 Between 1968
and 2014, firearms were the most common weapon used by LATs in the
United States and Europe and caused the most harm to civilians.59
Regarding selecting targets and victims, LATs typically target civilians.
According to a study from the CLAT project, LATs in Europe between
2000 and 2014 killed 195 people and injured 449, and most of them
were civilians.60 In other studies, civilians were also the most common
target of LATs and the second most common were government
employees, such as the police.61
The last factor examined in previous studies is leakage of information,
which refers to the intentional or unintentional leaking of information
because of the behavior or action of the LAT, thus revealing his/her
violent intentions. LATs typically have poor operational security and,
generally, tend to leak information about their intentions.62 According
to a study from the CLAT project, 44 percent of its sample (n=120), on
some level, informed others about their tendencies for violent activities
and radical actions.63 In Gill et al.’s sample (n=119), 64 percent of the
LATs revealed their tendencies to engage in terrorist activities to their
families and friends.64
Although there are many significant common characteristics and traits
among lone-actor terrorists, most of the studies above concluded that it
is not possible to present one single comprehensive profile of an LAT.65
Despite this diversity, there are some distinguishable differences
between subgroups of lone-actors. Moreover, making the effort to
characterize lone actors will uncover beneficial and useful facts for
combating terrorism.66

Data Collection
In this cross-sectional study, we collected data from secondary open
sources. Since accessing primary sources in terrorism studies is
difficult, using secondary sources is common.67 We collected the main
data from the GTD, created by the National Consortium for the Study
of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism and which contains
information on all terrorist incidents around the world. The
information available includes the date of the attack, the location, the
number of fatalities and injuries, the type of attack, the weapon used,
the victim or target, and the ideology of the terrorist. The GTD collects
its data from open sources such as media archives, existing data sets,
and legal documents.68
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Unfortunately, some data were missing at the GTD. These data
included demographic information about the terrorist—such as age,
migration status, leakage of information, previous criminal record,
radicalization process, social status, mental health status, and whether
the LAT was known or unknown by intelligence agencies. We manually
gathered these variables from secondary open sources, specifically
media and news websites based on a nonsystematic search.
Sample and Analysis
Previous researchers have already studied LATs between 1968 and
2014 in the United States and Europe.69 Therefore, the focus of this
present study is on lone-actor terrorism from the beginning of 2015
until the end of 2016. In collecting data, we searched the GTD’s dataset
for terrorist attacks categorized as LAT attacks in 23 Western European
countries (Appendix A). We selected these countries because most of
the LAT attacks between 2000 and 2014 in Europe took place in
Western European countries.70 After searching basic information about
the attacks and their respective LATs on the GTD, we searched the
name of the LAT or the name of the incident to find other variables and
to validate the findings; we searched at least three different opensource media for each case.
We analyzed the GTD database and other secondary open-source
media to identify the required variables based on a codebook
(Appendix B). We then analyzed all the gathered variables based on the
same codebook, which we developed by reviewing previous studies.
Appendix B defines all the variables and their sub-categories.

Results
Attack Characteristics
We identified 37 lone-actor terrorist attacks (36 actual attacks and one
plot). Most of the attacks were carried out in France (n=14; 37 percent),
followed by Germany (n=10; 27 percent) and the United Kingdom
(n=5; 14 percent). Of the 37 attacks, the majority (n=22; 60.5 percent)
were armed assaults (Table 1).
Table 1. Characteristics of the attacks
Attack
characteristics
Attack/plot
Country of attack

N
France
Germany
United Kingdom
Denmark
Sweden
Belgium
Italy
Spain

Prevalence

Percent

37
14
10
5
3
2
1
1
1

100
37
27
14
7.5
5.5
3
3
3
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Type of attack

Armed assault
Bombing
Unarmed assault
Assassination
Hostage taking
Facility
Kidnapping
Hijacking
Source: Global Terrorism Database.

22
3
3
3
3
2
1
1

60.5
7.5
7.5
7.5
7.5
5.5
3
3

LAT Characteristics
Of the 36 identified LATs, 35 were male. The age of the LATs varied
between 12 and 52, with the median age being 24. Most of the LATs
(n=16; 45 percent) were between 21 and 30 years old. Also, most of the
LATs (n=20; 56 percent) had no previous criminal record. Only 15
LATs (41.5 percent) had committed previous act of crime. Violent
crimes were the most common type of previous criminal act (n=8; 22.5
percent).
Regarding mental health status, information was available for 33 LATs.
Most of them (n=24; 67 percent) had no prior or current mental health
issues, while a quarter of the LATs (n=9; 25 percent) had a confirmed
history of mental health disorders before or at the time of the attack.
Concerning social status, no information was available for seven LATs.
Of the remaining 29 LATs, 13 (36 percent) were socially isolated at the
time of the attack. Further, seven of the 13 LATs with social isolation
also had mental health disorders.
Regarding migration status, only six LATs (16 percent) were natives of
the country they attacked. Eleven LATs (31 percent) were secondgeneration immigrants. Nine (25 percent) were first-generation
immigrants, seven (19 percent) were 1.5-generation immigrants in the
place of the attack, and only two were refugees (Table 2).

32
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol12/iss4/2
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.12.4.1736

Khazaeli Jah and Khoshnood: Profiling Lone-Actor Terrorists: A Cross-Sectional Study of Lone-

Table 2. Characteristics of Lone-Actor Terrorists
Offender
characteristics
Lone-Actor
terrorists
Age

Gender
Previous
criminal record
Type of criminal
record

Mental health

Social status
Social isolation
with mental
disorder
Migration status

Prevalence

Percent

N

36

100

11-20
21-30
31-40
41-50
51-60
Male
Female
Positive

10
16
8
1
1
35
1
15

28
45
22
2.5
2.5
97.5
2.5
41.5

Negative
Unknown
Armed robbery

20
1
3

56
2.5
8

Drug
using/trafficking
Violence
Theft
Gang related
Radical activity
Having mental
disorder
No mental disorder
Unknown
Isolated
Not isolated
Unknown
Positive

6

17

8
5
1
1
9

22.5
14
2.5
2.5
25

24
3
13
16
7
7

67
8
36
45
19
20

Negative
Second generation
immigrant
First generation
immigrant
1.5-generation
immigrant
Native
Refuge
Unknown

6
11

17
31

9

25

7

19

6
2
1
9

16
5.5
2.5
25

Known by
security and
intelligence
agencies

Under monitoring
3
Under surveillance
1
Source: Authors gathered the information from open sources.

8
2.5

Radicalization and Ideology
Most of the LATs (n=27; 75 percent) had radical Islamic views. The
second most common ideology was a right wing ideology, which
included four LATs (11 percent). The radicalization process of ten LATs
33
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(28 percent) is unknown. Fourteen LATs (40 percent) were radicalized
via social media and the Internet. Four LATs (12 percent) were
radicalized in prison, three (9 percent) through a personal network, two
(5.5 percent) through community network, and two others were
radicalized by contacting a terrorist group. Finally, 25 percent of all
LATs were known by the intelligence and security agencies at the time
of their attack (Table 3).
Table 3. Ideology and Radicalization of Lone-Actor Terrorists
Ideology and
radicalization
characteristics
Lone-Actor
terrorists
Radicalization

N

Prevalence

Percent

36

100

Internet
14
40
Prison
4
12
Personal network
3
8
Community
2
5
Network
Actual group
1
2
Non radicalized
1
2
Unknown
10
28
Ideology
Right wing
4
11
Anti-Muslim
2
5.5
Anti-Semitic
1
3
Unknown
2
5.5
Islamist
27
75
Source: Global Terrorism Database and information gathered by the authors from
open sources.

Modus Operandi and Typology
A knife was the most common weapon used by the LATs (n=16; 44
percent), and only a quarter of them (n=9; 25 percent) used firearms.
Regarding fatalities, overall, 128 people died because of these attacks,
and 571 others were injured. Civilians were the target of 37 percent of
the LATs. For 28 percent of the LATs, politicians, governmental places,
and public servants were the targets, while the other 28 percent
targeted religious figures and institutions (Table 4). Furthermore, the
loner was the most common type of LATs in this study (n=15; 42
percent), then the lone wolf (n=12; 33.5 percent), and then the lone
wolf pack (n=8; 22 percent) (Table 5).
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Table 4. Modus Operandi of Lone-Actor Terrorists
Modus operandi
characteristic
Lone-Actor
terrorists
Type of weapon

Target/Victim

Fatality
Injury
Leakage of
Information

Prevalence

Percent

N

36

100

Firearm
Knife
Vehicle
Incendiary/Arson
Explosive
Civilian
Government
Religious
figure/Institution
Private business
Education
institution
Unknown
N
N
Unknown

9
16
3
4
5
13
10
10

25
44
7
11
13
37
28
28

3
2

8
6

1
128
571
16

2
100
100
45

Positive
6
17
Negative
14
38
Source: Global Terrorism Database and information gathered by the authors from
open sources.

Table 5. Typology of lone-actor terrorists
Typology
Lone-Actor
terrorists
Typology

N

Prevalence
36

Loner
15
Lone wolf
12
Lone-wolf pack
8
Unknown
1
Source: Authors gathered the information from open sources.

Percent
100
42
33.5
22
2.5

LATs Based on Ideology
Regarding the relationship between attack characteristics and ideology,
the majority of the attacks (n=28; 76 percent) were carried out as the
result of Radical Islamic ideology. Right wing ideology, anti-Muslim
ideology, and anti-Semitic ideology accounted for eleven percent, five
and a half percent, and two percent of the attacks, respectively. Most of
the Islamic ideology attacks were undertaken in France (n=12; 33
percent), followed by Germany (n=8; 22 percent) and the United
Kingdom (n=3; 8 percent). Right wing LATs targeted Germany in two
out of the four right wing attacks. The other two right wing attacks took
place in Sweden and the United Kingdom.
Armed assault was the most common type of attack among Islamist
LATs (n=16; 43 percent). Twenty-Eight percent of the Islamist LATs
(n=10) targeted civilians in their attacks. The second most common
35
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target of Islamist LATs (n=9; 25 percent) was religious figures and
institutions, while the third was governmental institutions (n=6; 17
percent).
Of the 128 fatalities, Islamist LATs were responsible for 115 (90
percent) deaths, while right wing LATs were responsible for the
remaining fatalities. Islamist LATs also injured the majority (n=531; 93
percent) of the people. Right wing LATs accounted for the remaining
casualties.
Regarding leakage of information, all six LATs who leaked information
about their attacks or their intentions were Islamists. A majority of the
LATs in the most common age group (21–30) were Islamists (n=14; 39
percent). Islamist LATs were also the most common actors in the age
group 10–20 (n=8; 22 percent). Moreover, the youngest LAT was an
Islamist, while the oldest was right wing LATs. Regarding previous
criminal record, 10 of 15 LATs who had previous criminal records were
Islamists, while only one of the right wing LATs had a previous
criminal record. The other two were anti-Muslim and anti-Semitic.
Furthermore, most LATs suffering from mental disorders were
Islamists (n=5). Half of the right-wing LATs had mental disorders
(n=2). Regarding social status, Islamist LATs were isolated to a higher
degree (n=8). Moreover, three out of four right-wing actors were also
socially isolated.
Of the eleven second-generation immigrant LATs, nine were Islamists.
Additionally, Islamist LATs constituted the majority of the firstgeneration immigrants (seven out of nine). Most of the right-wing LATs
were native (n=3), and both refugee LATs were Islamist. Islamist LATs
also constituted the majority of the LATs known by intelligence and
security agencies (eight out of nine).
The majority of LATs who were radicalized via social media and the
Internet were Islamists (n=12), while the other two were right wing.
The majority of the loner types of LATs were Islamists (n=9; 25
percent). Islamist LATs were also the majority in the lone-wolf type
(n=10; 28 percent), and all of the eight lone-wolf-pack individuals were
Islamists (22 percent). Regarding right wing LATs, the majority were
loners (n=3).

Discussion
The purpose of this study was to evaluate whether there are common
characteristics among LATs. Our findings show that LAT attacks are
rapidly increasing and confirm other studies’ statements that this type
of terrorism is becoming more prevalent.71 While there were 198 LAT
attacks and plots between 1968 and 2010 in Western Europe and the
United States and 98 attacks and plots between 2000 and 2014 all
around Europe, this study shows that during only two years, 2015 and
36
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2016, LATs carried out 37 attacks in Western European countries
alone.72 Why LAT attacks have increased is not clear. However, it might
be attributable to massive propaganda by terrorist groups, encouraging
their sympathizers to act alone since it is more difficult for law
enforcement to detect them.73 Moreover, unlike the results from the
CLAT study showing that the United Kingdom has been the prime
target for LATs, the results of this study show that France has recently
become the prime target for LATs.74
Characteristics of LATs
Regarding the personal characteristics of LATs, the findings show
variations in comparison to previous results. The age of LATs has
decreased during the past three years; while the average age of LATs
was 29.7 in the CLAT study and 33 in the study by Gill et al., our study
indicates the average age has declined to 24 years.75 The age of the
youngest and the oldest LAT has also decreased from 15 and 74 in the
CLAT study to 12 and 52 in our study.76 This indicates that the age of
radicalization and engaging in violent political activities in Western
Europe is decreasing. The large number of Islamist LATs included in
this study and the fact that Islamist LATs tend to be younger may
explain this finding.77 The high use of the Internet and massive
propaganda by terrorist groups can be another reason since they tend
to affect young individuals active on the Internet.78 Shehabat et al. have
previously shown that social media is the primary space where
communication between radicalized individuals takes place and where
propaganda that inspires lone-wolf attacks circulates.79
In contrast to previous studies, where previous criminal records are a
non-specific factor, our study acknowledges the important role of this
factor, at least in the past three years.80 Our results show that criminals
have a greater tendency to engage in political violence. However, the
type of previous criminal record is still a non-specific factor. A report
from GLOBSEC supports our finding, discussing both LATs and group
based terrorism and indicating that individuals with a criminal record
are more prone to engage in terrorist activities.81
However, unlike traditional group-based terrorists, criminal gang
members are less likely to become LATs.82 Lone-actor terrorism is
more about individuals acting for non-personal purposes, whereas
engaging in terrorism for gang members is not a political or ideological
decision but rather in line with their personal financial or social
interests, such as engaging in drug or arms trafficking.83
Unlike previous results, our study findings show that mental disorders
are not common among LATs as only a quarter (25 percent) of LATs in
this study suffered from a mental disorder.84 Previous studies show
that the frequency of mental disorders among LATs varies with respect
to ideology. While the frequency of mental disorder among right wing
LATs is high, it is low among Islamist LATs.85 Accordingly, the low
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percentage of mental disorders in our study is not surprising since
most of the LATs in this study are Islamists.
Regarding social status, our results are in line with previous findings:
This factor is more specific than mental health status.86 From a
criminological point of view, this supports Hirschi’s social bond theory,
which claims criminal activity is the result of lack of social bond with
others (including family, friends, community, and social institutions
such as school and employers).87 Based on this theory, the lack of social
ties—or what this study refers to as social isolation—can lead to
criminogenic behaviors. However, unlike previous results, the
combination of social isolation and mental disorders is not a specific
factor in our study, as half of the socially isolated LATs had no mental
ill health.88
To our knowledge, no previous studies have considered migration
status as a factor regarding LATs. Of the 36 LATs in this study, 24 were
native, 1.5-generation, or second-generation immigrants in the target
country. Mainstream narrative claims that frustration and anger in
both 1.5 and second-generation immigrants in the host society may
lead to their susceptibility to radicalization.89 However, contrary to
public opinion and the claim of mainstream media, this study’s finding
clearly shows that it is not immigrants who are responsible for LAT
attacks; in fact, most of the LATs in this study were born and grew up
in the target countries and took part in their educational system and
values.
Another factor overlooked by previous studies is the level of
information that the intelligence and security agencies had on the LAT
before the attack. In counterterrorism, collecting and analyzing
intelligence is vital, and monitoring suspicious individuals and
activities is one of the best ways to collect data. Therefore, the ability of
someone monitored by or known to authorities to undertake an attack
represents a failure for the security agencies of that country. Although
we could not acquire the number of individuals monitored during the
specific time of this study in order to compare the results, it is still of
interest that nine of the 37 LATs included in this study were able to
continue with their attack despite being known and in some cases even
monitored by security and intelligence agencies. This supports the
belief that radicalization is a gradual and developmental process from
the point of being radicalized to the point of taking action.90 This time
in between is highly useful for intelligence and security agencies to
monitor, identify, and possibly arrest the individual.
Ideology and Radicalization
Regarding the radicalization process and the role of the Internet, this
study supports previous literatures and results.91 The Internet and
social media have become a haven for LATs to discuss and nurture
radical views without detection by an intelligence agency.92 Indeed,
ISIS used the concept of “e-jihad” to encourage their sympathizers and
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followers to be active on social media, particularly the apps Telegram
and Twitter.93
Regarding ideology, our findings agree with previous results that
radical Islamic views are the most common ideology expressed by
LATs.94 This may illuminate the effectiveness of the political
circumstances and the propaganda of radical Islamic groups in
converting individuals to LATs. Another reason may be that radical
Islamic groups are more organized than those of radical right and left
wing groups.
Modus Operandi and Typology
Regarding modus operandi, the present results show a significant
change among LATs. While the use of a firearm has always been the
most common modus operandi, this study shows that the knife has
replaced firearm as the most common weapon in attacks.95 Moreover,
firearm is no longer the most lethal weapon. In the two attacks with the
most fatalities (77 percent of the total) and injured (84 percent of the
total), the weapon used was a vehicle. These results indicate the
increasing possibility of conducting an LAT attack without any special
or sophisticated weapon while simultaneously making it more difficult
to prevent these kinds of attacks.
Another interesting result in our study has to do with the question of
information leakage. Although this variable was unknown for 45
percent of the LATs, unlike previous studies, only a minority of the
LATs (n=6) did in fact leak information about their attacks. 96 This
shows that the previous opinion, claiming that LATs typically have poor
operational security, has changed and is, at least in our study, not
true.97 While the CLAT study and the study by Gill et al. showed that 44
percent and 64 percent of the LATs, respectively, leaked information,
our finding shows that only 17 percent of the LATs leaked
information.98
Regarding the typology of LATs, findings of this study are in line with
previous results: Most of the LATs are loners, which also explains why
most of the LATs in this study were radicalized via the Internet.
However, the number of lone-wolf actors in the present study is
interestingly higher in comparison to an earlier study, which shows
that radical and terrorist groups are highly active in Western Europe in
trying to radicalize more individuals.99
LATs Based on Ideology
The absolute majority of the LATs were Islamists (n=27; 75 percent).
Consequently, the numbers of other ideologies were low, and we cannot
make effective conclusions about them. However, there are some
interesting findings.
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First, while Islamist LATs mainly targeted civilians, they were
simultaneously the LAT group that mostly targeted governmental
employees, predominately police officers. Although one right wing LAT
did target a politician as a government employee, interestingly, none of
the right wing actors targeted members of the police force. However,
the number of Islamic LATs in this study being higher than right wing
LATs may have affected this observation.
Second, the frequency of mental disorders among Islamist LATs
relative to their numbers is low; only five (19 percent) Islamic LATs
suffered from mental issues. This supports earlier findings about
mental disorders being uncommon among Islamist LATs.100
Third, regarding social status, our findings are also in line with
previous results. While most of the right wing LATs were socially
isolated, only 30 percent of the Islamist LATs were socially isolated,
possibly due to the strong social bonds and ties that radical Islamists
have with their families and their community.101
Fourth, regarding migration status, our results are in line with previous
literatures discussing group-based terrorism.102 The absolute majority
of Islamist LATs was second-generation immigrants or at least grew up
in the targeted country as 1.5-generation immigrants. This is perhaps
one the major challenges of the contemporary western world; How to
stop homegrown radicalization?
Fifth, only nine LATs were familiar to the security agencies. This
number, however, is not enough for a strong indication. Interestingly,
90 percent of them (eight out of nine) were Islamist. This may indicate
that Islamist LATs are more likely to engage in radical activities than
other known radical individuals or groups.
Limitations
Since accessing primary data in terrorism research is problematic, we
had to rely on secondary data. This is a limitation because it is less
reliable than primary data.103 However, since options other than
secondary sources are relatively limited in terrorism studies, using
secondary sources is common; most of the research and articles on
terrorism have relied on secondary sources.104 While most
criminologists use official data, victimization data, or self-reported data
for their quantitative studies, researchers discussing terrorism cannot
operate in the same way since intelligence and security agencies cannot
by law to share their data and information. Moreover, focusing on the
victim and victimization data is difficult due to the nature of the
criminal act. For obvious reasons, self-reported data on terrorists are
not possible to gather. In using secondary open sources, there are two
main problems: The question of the accuracy of the information and
the question of neutrality and the level of bias. To diminish the risk of
these two pitfalls, we have used different open sources to check the
correctness of the information.
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The small sample used in this study is another limitation.
Consequently, larger generalizations should be made with caution. This
is especially the case since the sample includes only nine non-Islamist
LATs.

Conclusion
We evaluated whether there are common characteristics among LATs
conducting terrorist attacks in Western European countries during
2015–2016. The findings of this study confirm that lone-actor
terrorism is a growing threat for Western European countries, and
although there is no single comprehensive profile for LATs, there are
common characteristics among them. Contrary to views about the
inefficiency of profiling in terrorism, our results illustrate that profiling
as a method can lead us to valuable knowledge about and a better
understanding of the phenomenon of lone-actor terrorism; it can also
allow us to plan more effective counterterrorism strategies and policies.
However, profiling is not a crime solver by itself, particularly in
discussing terrorism. Researchers use profiling in terrorism partly to
help law enforcement to focus on a particular set of offenders and
partly to help law enforcement with better and more effective risk
management. As a result, by analyzing noteworthy information on
previous LATs, profiling can provide public institutions, policy makers,
and even security and intelligence organizations with substantial
knowledge on the possible characteristics and traits of lone-actor
terrorists.
Future studies should focus on criminal profiling in terrorism studies.
This warrants a closer collaboration between the disciplines of
criminology and terrorism studies and more studies on profiling in the
area of terrorism. Since different circumstances affect terrorists,
studies should also focus on the modus operandi in relation to different
characteristics of the terrorist.
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Appendix A
List of Western European countries included in the study: Andorra,
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Gibraltar, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United
Kingdom, and Vatican City.

Appendix B
Codebook of Variables
Place of attack: The country in which the attack took place.
Type of attack:
1) Assassination: Targeting one or several specific individuals as
the aim of the attack.
2) Armed assault: An attack with the aim of harming human beings
by using a weapon including firearms, cold weapon, or any other
kind of hand weapon.
3) Bombing: An attack where explosive materials are used.
4) Hijacking: An action to take control of a vehicle.
5) Hostage taking: An action to take one or several individuals
hostage to use them to achieve a specific purpose.
6) Kidnapping: An action to take one or several individuals hostage
to use them to achieve a specific purpose.
7) Facility: Any form of attack against a non-human target, such as
buildings.
8) Unarmed assault: An attack with the aim of harming human
beings without using common weapons.
Age: The age of the LAT at the time of the attack.
Gender: The gender of the LAT (male or female).
Previous criminal record: Whether the LAT has been convicted of a
crime, thus having a criminal record.
Type of previous criminal record: The type of crime that the LAT has
been convicted of—including armed robbery, drug use, drug trafficking,
violence, theft, gang-related activities, and radical activities.
Social status: The social status of the LAT relating to social isolation.
Migration status:
1) First-generation immigrant: The LAT is foreign-born and
immigrated to the target country after his/her 18th birthday.
2) Second-generation immigrant: The LAT was born in the
target country from first-generation immigrant parents.
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3) 1.5-generation immigrant: The LAT was foreign born but
immigrated to the target country before early teens.
4) Native: The LAT was born in the target country from parents
who also were born in that country.
5) Refugee: Social, religious, political, or racial problems have
forced the LAT to leave his/her native country. In the current
study, a refugee also refers to an LAT who was an asylum
seeker in the target country.
6) Unknown: The migration status of the LAT is unknown, or
there is no available information about it.
Known by intelligence agencies: Whether the LAT was known to the
intelligence agency of the country in which the attack took place. We
divided this variable into two classifications that are more specific:
1) Under monitoring: The intelligence agencies were generally
monitoring the LAT.
2) Under surveillance: In addition to being under monitoring, all
the activities of the LAT (such as his/her social media accounts
and phone conversations) were specifically under surveillance.
Radicalization process: This variable shows the way in which the LAT
was radicalized. We divided it into six classifications:
1) Internet: Radicalization through the Internet.
2) Prison: The LAT was radicalized while in prison.
3) Personal network: The LAT was radicalized through his/her
personal network.
4) Community network: The LAT was radicalized through being in
a specific community. (The difference between personal network
and community network is as follows: In the former, the LAT
was radicalized through his personal contacts with specific
individuals he has learned to know. In a community network,
the LAT was radicalized because of being in a community, and
he/she would probably never have been radicalized if he/she
were not a member of that community.
5) Contact with a terrorist group: The LAT was radicalized by
having direct physical contact with a terrorist group.
6) Unknown: The radicalization process of the LAT is unknown.
Ideology: The ideological motivation of the LAT to carry out the attack.
We divided this variable into five classifications:
1) Right wing: The LAT has a right wing ideology—including antiimmigrant, neo-Nazi, and xenophobic views.
2) Anti-Muslim: The LAT has specific anti-Muslim views.
3) Anti-Semitic: The LAT has specific anti-Semitic and anti-Jewish
views.
4) Islamist: The LAT has radical Islamic views.
5) Unknown: The ideological motivation of the LAT is unknown.
Type of weapon: Type of weapon used by the LAT in the attack. We
divided this variable into five classifications:
1) Firearm.
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2)
3)
4)
5)

Knife or a sharp instrument.
Vehicle.
Incendiary/Arson: Using materials or instruments to cause fire.
Explosive: Dynamite, bombs, grenades, and explosive
ammunitions.

Target/Victim: This variable discusses which victim/target was the
main target of the terrorist attack. We divided this variable into six
classifications:
1) Civilian: The main targets are common citizens targeted
randomly.
2) Government: The main targets are governmental institutions
and organizations as well as public servants—including police
officers, soldiers, politicians, and others targeted because of
their governmental profession.
3) Religious figure/institution: The main targets are religious
leaders—such as imams, priests, or rabbis. This classification
also includes attacks on religious institutions—such as mosques,
churches, or synagogues.
4) Private business: The main targets are individuals, places,
institutions, or organizations targeted because of their financial
or commercial activities. They may be stores, restaurants, bars,
or gas stations.
5) Educational institutions: The main targets are schools,
universities, colleges, or any other educational institution or
their staff.
6) Unknown: Not clear why the LATs chose the specific target.
Fatality: The number of individuals killed in the attack or because of it.
If killed, the LAT is not included in the count.
Injury: The number of individuals injured because of the attack or
because of it. If injured, the LAT is not included in the count.
Leakage of information: Refers to the number of LATs who, for any
reason, leaked information about their coming attack. In this variable,
the term positive means that the LAT leaked information, negative
means that the LAT did not leak any information and unknown means
there was no available information about this variable in the specific
case.
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